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Law, Politics and the Dismal Science
a. Puzzles or Why Do Officials Choose the Fourth Best
Option?
Puzzle: Suppose you are the minister for trade of a
small Asian country that is rapidly developing. Several of your
small electronic components manufacturers export their products
to various countries of the world, and you are informed that one
of those importing countries has just decided to stop imports
from your country. What steps can you take? As a small country,
are you completely at the mercy of a larger economic power? In
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planning investment policies for your country designed partly to
export and obtain foreign exchange to pay off a staggering
external debt, what world market environment can you rely upon?
Puzzle: Suppose you are advising a large multinational
corporation based in the United States, and this company is
exploring the feasibility of a substantial investment in a plant
in a small underdeveloped country in Africa. Inexpensive labor
could give products of this plant a substantial advantage on the
world market, but in order to be economically viable this plant
must ship over 80 percent of its output outside the small country
which has only a tiny market for the product. A smaller plant
would not be able to achieve the economies of scale necessary to
make the enterprise flourish. Currently there are few government
barriers to imports of the projected product into either the
United States or Europe. Can you advise your client that it can
depend on those circumstances continuing long enough into the
future to be able to realize a satisfactory return on the
proposed investment?
Puzzle: Economists, government policy makers, and many
others tend to agree that barriers to international trade reduce
world welfare and often the welfare of the countries which impose
the barriers. If barriers must be imposed, such experts
generally agree that a tariff (or price effect measure) is
superior to quantitative restrictions. Yet quantitative measures
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to reduce trade have proliferated around the world --
particularly in recent years the so-called "voluntary export
restraint" devise, whereby the exporting country, at the request
of the importing country, restrains the amount of exports of a
product which will be shipped to the importing country. This
device seems favored even by the importing country although it is
often thought to have an even less favorable effect on the
economy of the importing country than the alternative whereby the
importing country imposes the quantitative measures itself. Why
is it then that governments tend to opt for the fourth best
measure?
These are only a few of a large number of puzzles
embedded in the subject of international trade today. These
puzzles cannot be solved by reference only to one academic
discipline, be it economics, or law, or political science.
Indeed, these puzzles may not be solvable at all. But the only
potential for discovering reasonable explanations or solutions
for these and many other similar puzzles is a pragmatic and
empirical analysis of the motivating factors and circumstances of
real transactions and government actions. Many different
disciplines, certainly all of those mentioned above, are required
to assist in that process.
b. The Meaning of Interdependence
In a world where trade across borders constitutes over
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50 percent of the Gross National Product of some countries, and
14 percent even for as large an internal market as the United
States, 1 it is no wonder that government leaders, businessmen,
and almost anyone else feels an "air of anxiety" about those
mysterious foreign influences which can affect daily lives so
dramatically.2
Even these statistics don't tell the whole story. It
is generally recognized that the influence of international
trade 3 on national economies has been growing for decades and can
be much more profound than the percentages stated might indicate,
both because the trade itself is often a much higher percentage
of the goods-producing sectors of economies and because a
multiplier or ripple effect amplifies the consequences of such
sectors expanding or contracting.
In sum, as frequently stated, the world has become
increasingly interdependent. With that interdependence has come
great wealth -- goods are produced where their costs are lowest;
the consumer has more choices; the institutions of production are
disciplined through competition; producers can realize the
advantages of economies of scale. But with that interdependence
has come a vulnerability. National economies do not stand alone
-- economic forces move rapidly across borders to influence other
societies. Government deficits in the United States can have an
impact on its interest rate which can push heavily indebted
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developing countries to the verge of "bankruptcy" (if such a
thing exists for sovereigns). An embargo or price rise
implemented by major oil-producing nations can cause deep and
frustrating unemployment, farm bankruptcies, and dramatic rises
in the cost of living in the United States. A recession in one
part of the world is rapidly felt in other parts. 4
These observations were underscored in an article by
Martin Feldstein in Foreign Affairs for Summer 19855 in which the
former Chairman of the U.S. Council of Economic Advisors said:
"The experience of the past few years has underlined
the interdependence of the world economy. Sharp
changes in international trade, in capital flows and in
exchange rates have affected all major economies. The
rise in real interest rates everywhere reflects the
close links among capital markets."
Economic interdependence creates great difficulties for national
governments. National political leaders find it harder to deliver
programs to respond to needs of constituents. Businesses fail or flail
in the face of greater uncertainties. Some laboring citizens cannot
understand why it is harder to achieve the standard of living to which
they aspired.
How did this interdependence, at least within the non-Communist
world, come about?
Perhaps the technological innovations of the post-World War II
era would have alone created these conditions, at least in the absence of
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major military fighting. The time and cost of transport has fallen
rapidly, so that this barrier to greater trade flows and service
exchanges has also dropped. Communications have become spectacularly
instantaneous -- we watch local wars in our living rooms on the T.V. news
by satellite, and it is possible now to order goods or shift huge sums of
money across oceans, literally in seconds. Information systems are
changing the character of markets, and also affecting business techniques
such as the control of inventories, the use of borrowed money, the
response to changing interest rates, and the adoption of new developments
of technology. But these scientific advances would have had little
influence if they had been resisted by governments, as can be observed in
the case of those governments that do resist them. 6
We must recognize that the international institutions erected or
reinstated by governments after World War II have made their
contribution. If some world organizations have failed to perform in the
manner contemplated by their founders, they have nevertheless contributed
symbiotically to the general trend of the world environment made possible
by the scientific innovations. This is particularly the case with the
economic institutions.
The 1944 Bretton Woods Conference launched the World Bank and
the International Monetary Fund. A few years later came a failed attempt
to add a complementary organization for trade, the ill-fated ITO of the
Havana Charter, but into the vacuum grew the GATT -- the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. These institutions were later joined by
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others, including the OECD, UNCTAD, and some important regional systems.
By the late 1960's, therefore, the liberalization of trade and financial
flows promoted by this post war system -- sometimes broadly called the
Bretton Woods System -- had progressed far enough to foster an
unprecedented surge of trade and to demonstrate the economic benefits
that flow from such liberalization. But at the same time, new problems
were emerging. The receding waters of tariff and other overt protection
inevitably uncover the rocks and shoals of non-tariff barriers and other
problems. As the European Economic Community has in recent decades
experienced, creating free trade requires attention to a group of
interrelated activities 7 such as the flow of capital, the flow of labor,
and the flow of technology and services. These in turn have
revolutionized government methods traditionally used to control fiscal
and monetary policy, taxation structure, environment regulation, product
standards, and liability for product defects. The propensity for
government summit meetings, both within the European region and on a
broader world-wide basis, is obviously not unrelated to these world
economic trends of interdependence. Likewise the attempts by governments
to combine their efforts through international organizations is a similar
result. The question is not whether a government will play on the
international scene, the questions are: Where will it play and with whom,
i.e. what forum will it work in, and which other governments is it
willing to let into its 'club'?
The problem of international economics today, then, is largely a
problem of "managing" interdependence. 8 The success of the Bretton Woods
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Systems has created a host of new problems. When economic transactions
so easily cross national borders, tensions occur merely because of the
differences between economic institutions as well as cultures. In
addition, the freedom of border "transit" sometimes allows unscrupulous
entrepreneurs to evade national government regulation. Even morally
sensitive entrepreneurs find their effective power enhanced when they can
move activity quickly from one nation to another. Governments, in
contrast, find themselves increasingly frustrated by effective evasion of
their regulatory powers. Furthermore, governments find that actions of
other governments cause them great difficulties.
Governments respond to these problems in a variety of ways. One
set of responses governments pursue is to join other governments in an
attempt to create an international regulatory system to help ameliorate
the "free-for-all" aspects of international trade such as
beggar-thy-neighbor policies, or to provide a unified posture to confront
the less public-spirited entrepreneurs. Another common response is to
develop internal policies designed to enable their nations to better cope
with the challenges of the world economy. Thus, governments adopt
"industrial policies"; measures to enhance "competitiveness"; measures
(usually at the border) to offset foreign government or private actions
deemed potentially damaging; or reciprocal responses of various kinds.
In considering any of these responses, however, governments
participating in the "Bretton Woods System" (as described in the next
chapter) confront international as well as national sets of rules,
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procedures and principles that may narrowly constrain their options. One
of the purposes of this book is to describe one part of that ,system --
the rules of international trade as developed principally in the context
of GATT, but related closely to national laws which regulate trade.
c. Do The Rules Work?
Let's explore one example: In recent decades the so-called
"injury test" has been one pillar of trade policy. When this test
applies, an importing country will presumably only impose restraints on
imports of a particular product if it can be established that such
imports are "injuring" its domestic industry which produces like or
similar products. An "injurious" import is defined as one which in
competing with the domestic product causes a decline in the domestic
industry.
Under international treaties as well as the domestic law of
major trading countries, the "injury" test is elaborately defined. In
some cases an independent agency is charged with ascertaining whether the
detailed legal criteria for "injury" have been met, and in other cases
appeal to the courts may be permitted.
Thus it was surprising and revealing to this author when some
years ago he was having a detailed conversation about trade policy with a
highly ranked trade official of a European country, and this official
blandly stated, "Oh, we can always find 'injury' whenever we need to for
political purposes."
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This comment about the ease with which detailed legal criteria
can be overcome for political purposes typifies a larger dilemma of
implementing international trade policy in major market oriented
countries today: the tension that is created when legal rules, designed
to bring the subject a measure of predictability and stability are
juxtaposed with the intense human needs of government to make
"exceptions" to solve short term or ad hoc problems. This tension poses
difficult problems for the practitioner and the chronicler. (Of course
trade policy is surely not qualitatively different in this respect, from
say tax policy, or unfair competition law, although it may be different
in degree.)
d. Contours of this Study
This book is about trade policy. But it is about trade policy
in the context of the legal, constitutional, and political realities that
constrain it. These constraints mold policy so much that the resulting
form scarcely if at all resembles the pure logic of the economic
theorist. Yet the economic theory is clearly part of the "reality."
Without the theory, the policy would often be directionless, lurching
from one inconsistent approach to another.
Thus the purpose of this book is to examine the theory and real
implementation of the policies of international trade in our contemporary
world in a way that attempts to explain how the theories have been
effectively constrained by the processes of real human institutions,
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especially legal institutions. The perspective of this book is that of a
legal scholar, of course. (This author's "comparative advantage" would
not realistically support any other perspective.) Yet the goal - not too
ambitious he hopes - of this author.is to explore the multi-disciplinary
context of trade policy rules. Charts, graphs, and formal mathematical
proofs will be eschewed here, because this author can fortunately rely on
the extensive literature and expertise of generous economist friends for
those. Nevertheless, the basic economic propositions of international
trade policy will be stated, and they will be seen to lie at the center
of this exposition. However, many other policies -- sometimes called
"non-economic" -- will also be examined. Indeed, in many cases we will
see a direct clash of inconsistent policies. In precisely those cases
lurks the greatest challenge to government action and the law. The basic
purpose of this book is to provide policy makers, practitioners,
students, and scholars of many different disciplines with an integrated
knowledge of the way in which the international trade "system" really
operates in today's complex and interdependent world
economic-legal-political environment.
Clearly the larger problem of international economics includes
many subjects in addition to trade in goods. Monetary issues, investment
flows, trade in services (such as transport, insurance, or banking) come
easily to mind. But the observable fact is that the "legal system" for
trade in goods, including both national and international rules, is the
most intricate and elaborate of rule systems which exist in the context
of international economic relations. 9 This book is devoted to that
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system of rules regarding trade in goods, partly because to take on the
broader field would make it impossible or at least much more difficult to
formulate any meaningful generalizations or hypotheses. Also motivating
this focus of attention is the surmise (which the reader will have to
evaluate for himself) that many of the principles, difficulties, and
advantages of the "trading system" are likely to be influential in the
evolving process of developing "legal systems" for other subjects.
Indeed, there are currently moves towards a "GATT for services" and "a
GATT for investment."1 0
In order to explore the trading system in any depth, however, it
is necessary to observe some inter-disciplinary linkages. Although this
book is written principally from the perspective of a legal scholar, it
would be an artificially narrow view of the subject to use only that
perspective. The driving principles are generally those of economics,
and the many constraints to policy besides legal norms are the sphere of
the political scientist. The subject of international trade policy is a
kaleidoscope pattern produced by the interplay of legal norms, political
science, and economics.
Throughout this work there will occur references to certain
basic themes. One of those has already been stated in the previous
sub-section: the tension between the necessity for legal rules for
stability and predictability, and the human need for solutions to short
term and ad hoc problems. In another sense this dilemma is largely the
well-recognized problem of political philosophy of the tug-of-war between
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rules and official discretion.. Other themes will be stated elsewhere in
this chapter, and in the final chapter.
This chapter, Chapter 1, continues in its next sections with
some further introductory reflections. In section 1.2 we turn to the
basic policy assumptions which underlie most of the law and policy
described in this book, starting with the doctrine of "comparative
advantage." Next we look at some of the policies, often termed
"non-economic" which compete with the doctrine of comparative advantage.
Certain basic concepts of international law related to international
economic affairs will be introduced in section 1.4. Finally we will re-
consider some of the underlying "themes" of this book's exploration of
trade policy.
Chapters 2, 3, and 4 outline the basic "constitutional
structure" of the contemporary world trading system. Chapter 2 will
examine the international structure, while Chapter 3 will focus on
domestic governmental structures, particularly those of the United
States. In chapter 4 we then explore the much discussed dispute
resolution and compliance problems.
Chapters 5 through 11 then take up specific "regulatory"
subjects of international trade. These are the "substantive issues" of
trade policy which are the core of the "system" today. Not all
substantive trade policy issues can be taken up in this book, of course,
but these eight chapters will cover the most significant as well as those
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most frequently encountered.
Chapters 12 and 13 then introduce problems which relate to
specific types of national economic structures. Chapter 12 examines
trade policy and the operation of the current trading "system" with
respect to developing countries. We here explore whether the system and
its rules work for developing countries, or whether they introduce some
biased constraints on those countries. Chapter 13 looks at a different
set of national economic structures, namely those often termed
"non-market". Of course the sets of nations focused on in these two
chapters are not exclusive -- they overlap extensively. Nevertheless the
implications for policy modification can differ substantially in these
two types of economies.
Finally, in Chapter 14 we will survey the scene we have painted
with such detail in the previous chapters, and ask ourselves some very
large questions. Some hypotheses will be offered as answers to some of
these questions, but clearly some of the questions are (at least at
present) unanswerable.
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1.5 The Tangled Web: Is There a Warp and Woof? (Themes)
Legal scholars sometimes refer to the "seamless web" of
the law. 1 The phrase connotes the notion that each legal concept
is in some way related to virtually every other legal concept.
It also connotes a certain skepticism of theory and of
simplifying concepts -- a skepticism which in many ways is
characteristic of the legal profession, which often views itself
as uniquely, among the learned professions, coming face to face
with the complexity and coarseness of reality with the aim of
solving real problems. It is sometimes said that the economist
tells us what should be done, while the lawyer is left to figure
out how to do it. This brings to mind the anecdote of the person
on a desert island who finds a can of vegetables and asks the
theorist how to open it. "Use a can opener," the theorist
replies. "But where do I find one?" asks the other castaway.
"Don't bother me with details!" responds the theorist.
The converse problem can also be dangerous -- there is
always the risk of losing sight of the forest because one's gaze
focuses on particular trees. Watch a lawyer and a social
scientist argue. The lawyer often cites specific cases -- the
"anecdotal evidence" -- to make his point. The social
scientist, on the other hand, will often use statistics to make
his point. There are dangers with each approach. In order to
formulate statistics it is often necessary to develop categories
for counting which are over-simplified. The specific case
May 24, 1988. Page 2
history can be a useful way to avoid this kind of
oversimplification. On the other hand the use of anecdotes can
often seriously mislead policy makers. "Once does not make
always"; the anecdotes may be atypical.
Thus we see the dilemma of a book like this. How can
some meaningful generalizations be stated in the short space
allotted for exposition of an extra-ordinarily complex subject?
There is always the danger of an apparently "unifying hypothesis"
seriously oversimplifying the subject and thereby misleading the
policy maker and problem solver. Yet without some generalization
it is difficult, if not impossible, to understand the subject.
Perhaps one way out of this difficulty is to state issues or
questions raised by the material, without in all cases trying to
formulate answers. In this book we try to do a little of both.
Some important themes or problems of the "world trade
policy system" have already been introduced. The dilemma of rule
versus discretion is one such theme, 2 to which we return
particularly in chapter 4. Closely associated with that theme is
the question of "effectiveness" of the trade rules: How
effective are they? How effective should they be? How can they
be made more effective (if that is desirable)?
The puzzle of an apparent tendency to choose second,
third, or even fourth best policy options has also been
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previously noted. 3 In these cases there are often non-economic
policy goals operating, sometimes without it being obvious. Some
of the conflicting policy goals have to do with the legal and
constitutional structure of the "system." A certain
constitutional political structure can impose severe constraints
on decision makers, as we shall see particularly in the next two
chapters. For example, a constitutional requirement of
parliamentary approval can often lead officials to seek
non-legislative ways to resolve problems, even if such ways
appear to be less optimal (in economic theory) than the option
selected. Yet, there are important policy reasons for the
existence of constitutional structure, e.g. preventing a monopoly
of power or preserving a representative form of government.
Sometimes the "obstructiveness" of lawyers ("you can't do that,
it's unconstitutional!") is merely the exercise of a
constitutional cautionary function ("Think about the really
long-term consequences of what you want to do").
One persistent theme that becomes apparent in the study
of trade policy and law is the close interaction of national and
international institutions. Each has a strong influence on the
other, and it is impossible to understand this subject fully (and
many others in today's interdependent world!) without noticing
and analyzing how these influences operate. The U.S.
Constitution had a direct influence on the shaping of the GATT
(as the next chapter will show). Vice versa, much of current
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U.S. trade legislation can only be understood in the context of
the GATT rules. 4 The tendency for academic subject matters to
separate international from national or domestic issues becomes
an important source of misunderstanding.
A frequently discussed and debated topic of current
trade policy is the question of what is "unfair" government or
private activity. Politicians and others commonly declare, "Of
course I am for liberal trade, but it must be fair trade. We
must take action against all those unfair trade activities of
other nations, even if that means restraining imports from them."
But how do we tell what is "fair?" In Chapters 10, 11 and 12 we
struggle with this theme. Closely related to it is another
theme, which this author has termed the "interface" problem.
This refers to the difficulty, in the current interdependent
world, of trade among different types of economies. Some of the
"unfairness" problems are in reality "differentness" problems.
We come across this type of issue in a number of later chapters,
but most especially in chapters 10, 11 and 12 again.
Thus we have expressed a sort of "consumer warning."
Don't expect too much of this book. Problems which appeared
intractable before you read it will in many cases still appear
intractable afterward. But it is hoped that this monograph will
contribute at least modestly to an understanding of why those
problems appear to be intractable.
May 24, 1988. Page 5
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CHAPTER 14: CONCLUSIONS AND PERSPECTIVES
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Section 14.1: The "Trade Constitution"
What we have explored in the preceding chapters can be
characterized overall as the "Constitution" for international
trade relations in the world today. It is a very complex mix of
economic and governmental policies, political constraints, and
above all (from this author's perspective) an intricate set of
constraints imposed by a variety of "rules" or legal norms. It
is these legal norms which provide the skeleton for the whole
system. Attached to that skeleton are the softer tissues of
policy and administrative discretion. Even the skeleton is not
rigid or always successful in sustaining the weight placed upon
it. Some of the "bones" bend and crack from time to time. And
some of the tissues are unhealthy.
This "constitution" imposes different levels of
constraint on the policy options available to public or private
leaders. Some of the "rules" are virtually immutable. Others
can be changed more easily. Part of the complexity of the whole
system is this variety of constraints which limit the
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realistically available options for solving problems. In
addition there are different contexts or levels for these
constraining rules. Some of these constraints come from national
or sovereign state governmental systems (e.g. the constitution of
the United States, or statutes of a GATT member country). Other
rules come from the international system and its treaty mosaic,
centering for our purposes on the GATT system, but also reached
by other elements of the Bretton Woods system and indeed the
entire structure of international law (weak as it may be.)
Some of these "constitutional" constraints are sources
of great annoyance both to decision makers and to economists.
The rules, they will sometimes say, too often "get in the way."
Indeed, with respect to the "trade constitution", they are
probably right. As we will discuss below there is considerable
reason to be discontent with that "constitution" as it exists
today, and to worry about its weaknesses and defects in the
context of the type of interdependent world with which we are
faced.
However, some of the constraints are the result of
important and necessary principles, resulting from competing
policy goals of the total system (not just that for international
trade.) For example, there is no question but what the U.S.
constitutional "separation of powers" principles are the source
of great annoyance for decision makers, who must struggle with
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the constant tensions of the Executive-Congress power struggles.
Yet the great genius of the draftsmen of this Constitution was
their understanding of the need to disperse power so as to avoid
its abuse. Thus in a broader context, the separation of powers
principle can be seen to have greater importance than the needs
for shorter term solutions to disagreeable international economic
and trade problems.
Likewise, a rule oriented structure of the portion of
the skeleton devoted to international treaties for trade (GATT)
is often a source of annoyance and aggravation. Yet that rule
structure itself, as outlined in Chapter 4, has potential values
for creating greater predictability, redressing unfair power
imbalances, and preventing escalating international tensions. In
some instances it is more important that international disputes
be settled quietly and peacefully, than it is that they conform
to all correct economic policy goals.
Like almost all government activity, the international
trading system and its constitution contain conflicting and
competing policy goals. Thus, like most government institutions,
the methods for resolving or "compromising" these competing goals
is crucial for the potential longer range success of the system.
For example, the worthy objectives of liberal trade (based on
economic principles such as comparative advantage) will often
conflict with goals (at least short run) of protecting poorer or
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weaker parts of a society's citizenry. Thus, as we saw in the
chapter on safeguards, the "pureness" of liberal trade policies
is relaxed somewhat to accommodate some competing goals of
helping the poorer to adjust. (Of course, the constitutional
structure of the system sometimes perversely also assists the
more privileged of the world's producers to perpetrate that
privilege at the expense of others -- merely illustrating one of
the many imperfections in the system.) The "conservative social
welfare function," so ably described by Max Corden, realistically
explains the approach of many national governments in today's
world. Even if Corden and his admirers (including this author)
do not always feel such function is wisely administered, yet it
can be defended in some circumstances as an appropriate
governmental goal which also competes with purer versions of
liberal trade policy.
With these observations we can now see some approaches
to solutions for the puzzles posed in chapter 1. How vulnerable
is a small country to blocking by other nations of the small
country's exports? As we have seen, at the moment almost the
only recourse or inhibition on such action by importing nations
is the GATT system. Defective as it is, it nevertheless plays a
crucial role in constraining some of the more rampant national
governmental actions which would otherwise restrict trade and
defeat important expectations of small (and large) exporting
countries.
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Likewise one puzzle was that faced by the investor who
needed some longer term dependability of export markets for his
new plant to be a viable investment. Again the GATT system is
crucial (and not necessarily too comforting!) Without this
system, the degree of predictability would be even considerably
less.
Why do governments choose fourth best economic policy
options? It should now be clearer. The intricate interplay of
the international rules and the national constitutions and norms
gives us the necessary clues. National executives prefer to
avoid going to Congress or parliaments in order to obtain the
necessary authority for certain approaches, and this may rule out
some options. The international rules provide in some
circumstances the onus of "compensation" or re-balancing of
negotiated benefits, which impose constraints. Thus governments
may pursue "informal" measures or other approaches which are less
advantageous in economic terms, in order to avoid some of the
national or international rule imposed "costs" of particular
actions. The use of export restraint arrangements particularly
comes to mind.
In this final chapter, we will look briefly at a summary
of some of the main principles governing how the trading system
works. We then turn to a review of some of the many defects or
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weakness of that system. Next we will briefly mention some of
the longer term key policy questions which lurk within this
system, and in a final section, we will draw an end to our
discussions in this book.
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Section 14.2: How the System Works
We can now summarize, or at least characterize, how the
world's "trade constitution" works, such as it is. As noted in
the previous section, this system is a complex interplay of both
national and international norms, institutions and policies. It
cannot be understand if only the international part is studied,
nor can it be understood if only the sovereign national states
are studies. The linkages are extremely significant: the GATT
is what it is, at least partly because of the United States
constitutional structure, and more recently, the structure of the
European Economic Community. U.S. law is what it is at least
partly because of the GATT. To explore how to achieve certain
policy options, one must know not only the procedures for rule
formulation or treaty change in the GATT, but also the similar
procedures in at least some of the key nation-state GATT members.
Within major GATT trading nations, a cardinal principle
of the administrating (executive) authorities is often to avoid
seeking legislation from the legislature. Thus the
constitutional allocation of powers, embellished by the
authorities which are contained in existing legislation, often
become significant constraints on policy selection.
A core part of the system is the vast body of GATT
tariff bindings, made significant and relatively enforceable
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because of the GATT and its institutional make up. An additional
part of the system (perhaps less effective) is the "code of
conduct" established by the many other GATT rules and extended
for at least some nations by the various "side codes" of the GATT
described in various chapters above.
Important additions to the system come from national
government laws and institutions, most particularly those
relating to "unfair trade practices." In many cases national
procedures provide for initiation of complaints by private
entrepreneurs, and various nations have rules which differ in the
extent to which government officials are "mandated" to carry out
certain actions, or have discretion to choose among various
possibilities. We have seen that the U.S. Congress has strongly
pushed the U.S. law in the direction, at least for dumping and
subsidy countermeasures, of mandatory import restraints, and this
is posing certain threats to the liberal trade policies of the
system. Part of the congressional impetus for this approach is
the distrust by the Congress of Executive branch handling of
trade policy in the past, but also some of the impetus stems from
the natural proclivity of members of Congress to please
particular constituents.
All in all, however, the system does work; or perhaps it
would be better to say that the GATT system operates better than
anyone had a right to expect, given the uncertain beginnings and
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the various gaps in this "trade constitution."
Word Count = 478
Bytes = 3134
File = BKWP14-2.TXT
Footnote File = Same
May 25, 1988. Page 1
Section 14.3: Weaknesses of the Trade Constitution
Although it works (sort of), there is plenty of reason
for much of the concern expressed about this system, as we have
now seen. What are these concerns?
Most fundamental (and perhaps most difficult to remedy)
is the basic constitutional infirmity of the GATT as a treaty and
an organization. It was never intended to be what it has become,
and as we have seen the GATT has become what it is largely
through an evolutionary and pragmatic adaptation to the role
thrust upon it when the ITO failed to come into being. This has
meant:
- changes in the trade rules are hard to achieve;
amending the GATT is almost impossible, and so the trading
nations have turned to other measures such as "side codes" (which
have some troublesome side effects) to establish changes in the
trading rules
- the GATT membership is changing and expanding;
different types of societies are entering the GATT fold, and some
are still left out
- loopholes or lacunae in the GATT rules have been
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troublesome, partly because of the difficulty of changing GATT
rules
- the GATT has not yet manifested its ability to house
amicably under its single roof vastly different economic systems,
including those termed "non-market"
- problems of agriculture trade have so far been
intractable
- some urge the GATT approach to be extended to areas of
international economic endeavor not heretofore covered by the
GATT system, such as trade in services
- rule implementation has sometimes been troublesome in
GATT, as a number of nations avoid GATT rules by subterfuge,
exploiting lacunae in the rules, or merely by exercising their
power
- the procedures for dispute settlement have been
heavily criticized and need attention
- subsidy rules in particular have been a source of
great confusion, disagreement, and dissatisfaction
- the GATT as an organization has probably not developed
sufficiently to accomplish all the responsibilities heaped upon
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it; in particular the secretariat may be inadequate
Not only the GATT can be criticized, however. The laws
and procedures of national governments leave much to be desired.
For example, in the United States there is much ambiguity and
potential for troublesome delay in situations when a GATT dispute
settlement panel and procedure rules that the U.S. is obligated
to change its law because of GATT rules. The Congress or the
administration does not always efficiently implement such
international rulings, a situation which tends to induce other
countries also to resist such rulings and to generally reduce the
respect for and predictability of the rules of the trading
system.
In the United States there is some concern about the
inefficiency of the U.S. national laws and procedures relating to
"unfair trade practices", particularly those involving dumping or
subsidies. This includes the worry that the procedures are
cumbersome, slow, and very costly, in some cases becoming
themselves barriers to liberal trade among nations.
In addition there is general concern about the
functioning of the U.S. Congress. Its vulnerability to narrow
local constitutional interests and to certain powerful lobbies,
especially in the absence of strong Presidential leadership, is a
worry expressed by many about the U.S. Constitution. The
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performance of the Congress in trying to shape a trade bill
during 1985, 1986, 1987 and 1988 must be seem as evidence of
failure of the Congressional processes, confirming those worries.
Concerns can also be expressed about the trade laws of
other governments. The European Economic Community is in the
process of an agonizing constitutional evolution which sometimes
renders its relations to the GATT system less than satisfactory
from the point of view of other nations.
Likewise the influence on international trade policy
and negotiations, of approaching national elections (and when is
there none?), especially in Europe, can often be observed raising
worries similar to those about the U.S. Congress.
More could obviously be said, but we need to turn to
some key policy questions.
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Section 14.4: Some Fundamental Policy Questions
Clearly the implications of the preceding section are
that considerable attention is warranted for the basic
constitutional structure of GATT. New mechanisms for rule making
and rule evolution would be welcome, and this may imply some sort
of "steering group" or other institution. Perhaps sometime
governments will even be bold enough to consider a new "OTC" type
charter, i.e. a brief treaty of only institutional measures (not
covering substantive obligations), such as that tried
unsuccessfully in the mid 1950's.1
The dispute settlement procedures are also under close
scrutiny as we have elsewhere discussed. 2  The critical question
whether such procedures should be tilted towards a "rule
orientation" or "power orientation", (or what should be the
appropriate intermediate mixture) is still unresolved. To what
extent are governments today willing to submit to "rules", and to
rule implementing procedures which effectively reduce the
discretion of national officials? How far will governments trust
dispute settlement panels with "big issues" of trade policy? Can
a rule system at least partly serve to replace the "hegemonic"
system which many commentators suggest has been lost, as U.S.
relative economic power has declined? 3
A particularly fundamental question, not often
"
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discussed, is the issue of what techniques are appropriate to
"manage interdependence." Several alternative approaches can be
suggested including: 4
- Harmonization, i.e. a system which gradually induces
nations towards uniform approaches to a variety of economic
regulations and structures. An example would be standardization
of certain product specifications. Another example would be
uniformity of procedures for applying countervailing duties or
escape clause measures.
- Reciprocity, i.e. a system of continuous "trades" or
"swaps" of measures to liberalize (or the contrary) trade. GATT
tariff negotiations are in this mold.
- Interface, which recognizes that different economic
systems will always exist in the world and tries to create the
institutional means to ameliorate international tensions caused
by those differences, perhaps through buffering or escape clause
mechanisms.
Obviously a mixture of all these techniques is the most likely to
acceptable, but that still leaves open the question of what is
the appropriate mixture. For example, how much should the "trade
constitution" pressure nations to conform to some uniform
"harmonized" approaches, or is it better to simply established
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buffering mechanisms which allow nations to preserve diversity
but try to avoid situations where one nation imposes burdens
(economic or political) on other nations?
Closely connected to this previous point, is an issue
which may be loosely characterized as that similar to
"federalism." This is the issue about the appropriate allocation
of decision making authority at different levels of government.
Each federal nation faces this issue, i.e. what is the
appropriate allocation of power between the national government,
or subordinate state or municipal governments? The international
system broadly and the international trade system in particular,
also face this question. As interdependence drives nations to
more concerted action, there also arises the question whether a
gradual drift of decision making authority upward to
international institutions is always best for the world. How
much power do we want to delegate to such international
institutions? In what instances do we wish to preserve local or
subordinate government control on the grounds that such
government is closer to the affected constituents? To what
degree does a "harmonization" approach to managing
interdependence unduly interfere with these "federalism"
principles of maintaining decision making closer to affected
individuals and firms?
One very perplexing issue is that of the appropriate
a
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linkage of international economic policies and measures to "non-
economic" policies such as human rights, or geopolitical
considerations. Many enterprises and their leaders (at least in
the U.S.) have been arguing against any such linkage. They argue
that measures such as trade boycotts, or removing MFN privileges,
often tend to be self-defeating and only allow competing nations
and firms to move in with trade to fill the gap. Yet national
leaders of powerful states cannot easily eschew the use of
economic measures, particularly since the use of more "active" or
military approaches have become less and less feasible. Economic
measures are often the sole usable instruments of diplomacy.
Noone denies that if a nuclear war can be avoided by the use of
an economic trade measure, such is appropriate. But that type of
causal connection is never presented. But if the "trade
constitution" provided for a more effective channel of concerted
economic actions to encourage better human rights treatments in
some states, or to discourage risky national military moves or
terrorism, to what degree should such economic actions be allowed
or encouraged? Clearly there are some causal connections between
economic measures and other policy goals, even though in many
instances it appears that the economic measures do not work too
well. 5 Enlarging the EC to include Greece, Spain and Portugal
had a large component of non-economic policy in it. Other
examples can be readily cited. It has been argued that economic
interchange and discourse can play an important role in promoting
understanding among nations and their citizens, and that it can
a
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also build constituencies for identity of interests which cross
national boundaries and thus discourage resorts to force.
There is an important policy issue in connection with
the "trade constitution's" principles of non-discrimination,
particularly the MFN principle discussed in Chapter 6. It must
be recognized that MFN policies have some costs as well as
benefits. Thus the question arises in connection with many trade
measures, whether MFN principles should be observed or not.
Closely related but not identical is the question of
"multilateralism" versus "bilateralism." Which of these
approaches best promotes the longer run interests of the system?
Within national governments there are also a number of
fundamental policy issues closely linked to the international
"trade constitution." One of these is the degree to which a
"legalistic" or "adversary" system of administrating trade laws,
(such as the U.S. anti-dumping and countervailing duty systems),
is best. A more legalistic or litigious approach has its costs,
including attorney and consultant fees, time delay, and
government costs. On the other hand it may in some situations
provide better information to decision makers, allow interested
parties to make their case and give them the feeling that they
have had their "day in court", and avoid corruption through
transparency. 6
a
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Also within national governments is the question of the
appropriate distribution of power as between courts and
administrative officials. What is the appropriate role of courts
in reviewing trade measures undertaken by administration
officials? Should the courts exercise great deference to the
administrators on the grounds of the relative lack of expertise
and of information gathering techniques of the courts? Or will
such deference result in increasing abdication of judicial
responsibilities to maintain fairness and completeness of
decisions, as interdependence extends to more human endeavors?
Word Count = 1171
Bytes = 8109
File = BKWP14-4.TXT
Footnote File = Same
S
May 25, 1988. Page 1
Section 14.5: Prospects and Worries
More than forty years after the current world "trade
constitution" was launched as part of the immediate post World
War II Bretton Woods system, we still find that the central
institution of this constitution is an organization which was not
intended to be an organization, a treaty that is yet only
"provisionally" in force, and an incredibly complex tangled web
of international agreements and provisions modifying, explaining,
or escaping those agreements. That it works at all is truly
surprising. Yet this GATT system does work, and as we have said,
considerably better than anyone had a right to expect at the end
of the 1940's.
But clearly it is defective. As the world becomes
increasingly interdependent, and increasingly vulnerable to
rapidly changing and rapidly transmitted economic forces, it is
impossible not to worry about the question whether the "trade
constitution" can stand up the stresses it is likely to face in
the next few decades. One of the negotiating topics listed on
the agenda for the Uruguay round of trade negotiations is "future
of the GATT system", or "FOGS" for short. Whether this or other
endeavors can succeed in time to bring into effect sufficient
improvement in the trade constitution so as to avoid a worldwide
economic disaster, no one can say for certain. Yet the
1
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reasonable but surprising success of the past few decades, based
largely on pragmatic and evolutionary problem solving techniques,
do give us some reason to be optimistic. Let us hope therefore,
that the world's economic diplomats will be able to continue to
"pull it off". Let us also hope, however, that they can begin to
develope changes which will move the trade constitution, even if
slowly, towards a system which is not so vulnerable to short term
ad hoc "fixes", but instead can establish the framework for
mutual international cooperation in a manner creating both the
predictability and stability needed for solid economic progress,
but also for the flexibility necessary to avoid floundering on
the shoals of parochial special national interests.
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